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  NOTE 
Plight of the Public Defender: Excessive 
Caseload as a Non-Mitigating Factor in 
Sanctions for Ethical Violations 
Order, In re Karl William Hinkebein, No. SC96089 (Mo. Sept. 12, 2017) 
Taylor Payne* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court stated in United States v. 
Cronic, “Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be repre-
sented by counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects his ability to as-
sert any other rights he may have.”1  Indeed, the right to counsel contained in 
the Sixth Amendment2 is an indispensable protection of the “fundamental 
right to a fair trial.”3  This truth is perhaps most evident when an indigent 
individual is accused of a crime and faces the loss of life or liberty.  In 1963, 
the landmark decision of Gideon v. Wainwright was handed down wherein 
the Court for the first time held that indigent criminal defendants facing the 
possibility of imprisonment must be provided counsel at the government’s 
expense.4  As the Court declared in the years following Gideon, “[N]o person 
 
* B.A., University of Missouri, 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2019; Associate Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2018–2019.  I am grateful to 
Professor Rodney Uphoff for his wisdom and guidance during the writing of this 
Note, and I thank the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing process. 
 1. 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984) (quoting Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State 
Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956)). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 3. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984); see also Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (“‘(The assistance of counsel) is one of the 
safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human 
rights of life and liberty.’” (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938)); id. 
at 344 (“The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be 
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.”). 
 4. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344–45. 
 
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have 
laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to as-
sure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal 
before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged 
with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him. 
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may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, 
or felony, unless he [has the opportunity to be] represented by counsel at his 
trial.”5  Though states are obligated to provide counsel to indigent state de-
fendants, the Court has made it clear that each state remains free to carry out 
this obligation as it sees fit.6  As a result, states have approached public de-
fense in various ways.  In some states, the right to counsel is provided on a 
county-by-county or even town-by-town basis.7  In others, however, public 
defense is overseen at the state level.8  Missouri is a state of the latter sort.9 
In addition to the United States Constitution,10 the right to counsel for 
indigent defendants in Missouri is commanded by the Missouri Constitution11 
and reiterated in Missouri’s Supreme Court Rules.12  So what exactly does it 
mean to have a right to counsel?  The United States Supreme Court has long 
held that pro forma appointment of counsel is not sufficient; effective and 
competent assistance of counsel is required.13 
 
Id. at 344 (felonies); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002) (sus-
pended sentences); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1972) (misdemean-
ors); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (juvenile). 
 5. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37. 
 6. Know Your State, SIXTH AMEND. CTR., http://sixthamendment.org/know-
your-state/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2018). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See generally MO. ST. PUB. DEFENDER, https://publicdefender.mo.gov/about-
mspd/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2018). 
 10. The right to counsel contained in the Sixth Amendment has been incorpo-
rated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 
343 (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243–44 (1936)) (“[C]ertain 
fundamental rights, safeguarded by the first eight amendments against federal action, 
were also safeguarded against state action by the due process of law clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and among them the fundamental right of the accused to the 
aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.   
 11. See MO. CONST. of 1945, art. I, § 18(a) (“[I]n criminal prosecutions the ac-
cused shall have the right to appear and defend, in person and by counsel.”). 
 12. MO. SUP. CT. R. 31.02.  Persons accused of offenses, “the conviction of 
which would probably result in confinement,” must be informed by the court of their 
right to counsel should they be without counsel during their first appearance before a 
judge.  Id.  Moreover, the court must inform the defendant of the court’s willingness 
to appoint counsel to him should he be unable to afford representation on his own.  Id.  
The court’s duty to appoint counsel to an indigent defendant is only waived after a 
defendant has been informed of his rights to counsel and intelligently waives them 
nonetheless.  Id. 
 13. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (“It has long been 
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of coun-
sel.”); see also State ex rel. Wolfrum v. Wiesman, 225 S.W.3d 409, 412 (Mo. 2007) 
(en banc) (“Any defendant that has exercised his right to counsel is guaranteed effec-
tive assistance of counsel, and courts should do the utmost to protect the defendant’s 
right to adequate and competent representation.”); Taylor v. State, 262 S.W.3d 231, 
249 (Mo. 2008) (en banc) (“The Sixth Amendment affords all citizens facing criminal 
2
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The Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct (“Missouri Rules”) require 
just the same: competent representation.14  In fact, the very first obligation 
laid out in the Missouri Rules is the obligation to provide competent repre-
sentation to a client.15  Of course, the Missouri Rules require more than just 
competence.  They also require counsel to effectively communicate16 with 
clients, be diligent in their representation,17 and much more.18 
The Missouri Rules apply to public defenders just as they do to every 
other attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Missouri.  However, 
currently in Missouri, public defenders in particular often find themselves 
incapable of conforming their representation with the Missouri Rules because 
they have far too many cases, not enough time, and work under a system of 
state government that cannot or will not provide adequate funding.19  Like 
any other attorney who violates the Missouri Rules, public defenders can be 
sanctioned and even disbarred for failing to uphold their ethical obligations. 
This Note discusses the thought-provoking ruling in In re Karl William 
Hinkebein20 and its implications for public defenders in Missouri.  Part II of 
this Note details the facts and holding of the case.  Part III of this Note gives 
a brief history of the Missouri State Public Defender System (“MSPD”), 
highlighting its current shortcomings and challenges.  Part III then discusses 
the influential ethics opinion issued by the American Bar Association 
(“ABA”) and the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA 
Standards”). 
Part IV of this Note analyzes the decision of the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri to sanction Karl Hinkebein.  Part V discusses the effect of Hinkebein on 
public defenders around the state and the unforgiving circumstances in which 
many public defenders find themselves.  Finally, this Note concludes in Part 
V with a brief discussion of potential systemic reforms to MSPD. 
  
 
charges the right to effective assistance of counsel.”).  Effective representation under 
the Sixth Amendment requires appropriate “investigat[ion], prepar[ation], and pre-
sent[ation of] the client’s case” by counsel.  Id. 
 14. See MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.1; see also State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. 
Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 597 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (discussing that the Sixth 
Amendment does not sanction pro forma appointment and that a court should consid-
er counsel’s competency before ordering appointment). 
 15. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.1 (“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a 
client.  Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness 
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”). 
 16. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.4. 
 17. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.3. 
 18. See generally MO. SUP. CT. R. 4. 
 19. See infra Section III.B. 
 20. Order, In re Karl William Hinkebein, No. SC96089 (Mo. Sept. 12, 2017), 
https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=117575 [hereinafter Hinkebein Order]. 
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
Karl William Hinkebein (“Hinkebein”) is a public defender with 
MSPD.21  Hinkebein became licensed to practice law in the state of Missouri 
in 1993.22  At the time the instant case was filed, he had worked in the Cen-
tral Appellate Post-Conviction Relief (“Appellate/PCR”) division of MSPD 
for over twenty years, and his primary work consisted of representing indi-
gent clients who moved, pro se, for post-conviction relief.23 
The instant case arose from a complaint filed by Darin Robinson with 
the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel (“OCDC”).24  Darin Robinson was a 
client to whom Hinkebein had been assigned as counsel.25  Robinson’s com-
plaint to OCDC charged that Hinkebein failed to uphold his professional con-
duct obligations.26  Specifically, Robinson asserted Hinkebein failed to keep 
him informed about the status of his post-conviction case and failed to file 
required motions.27  Through investigation of Robinson’s complaint, OCDC 
discovered Hinkebein failed to uphold his professional conduct obligations 
with five additional clients to whom Hinkebein had been assigned as coun-
sel.28  The instant case thus encompassed Hinkebein’s professional conduct 
violations relating to six different indigent defendants, including Robinson.29 
On March 31, 2016, OCDC filed an information charging Hinkebein 
with violating Missouri Rules 4-1.3 (diligence) and 4-1.4 (communication).30  
Rule 4-1.3 mandates that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client.”31  Rule 4-1.4 dictates that 
 
(a) A lawyer shall: 
(1) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the 
matter; 
(2) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; 
and 
 
 21. Informant’s Brief at 7, In re Hinkebein, No. SC96089 (Mo. Sept. 12, 2017), 
2017 WL 3195810, at *7.   
 22. Id. 
 23. Id.; see also David Carroll & Phyllis Mann, Missouri’s “Perfect Storm” 
Explained, SIXTH AMEND. CTR. (Oct. 16, 2017), http://sixthamendment.org/missouris-
perfect-storm-explained/; see also MO. SUP. CT. R. 29.15 (“Within [thirty] days after 
an indigent movant files a pro se motion, the court shall cause counsel to be appointed 
for the movant.”). 
 24. Informant’s Brief, supra note 21, at 8. 
 25. Id. at 8. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. at 10–12. 
 28. Id. at 8. 
 29. See id. at 9–23. 
 30. Id. at 8. 
 31. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.3. 
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(3) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the 
lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows the client expects as-
sistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or 
other law. 
 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably neces-
sary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the 
representation.32 
 
Hinkebein entered his appearance as Robinson’s counsel on February 
14, 2011.33  Hinkebein filed a motion for an extension of time to file an 
amended Rule 29.15 motion34 and was granted the extension of time to 
March 13, 2011.  Hinkebein did not write to the prison in which Robinson 
was incarcerated to arrange telephone calls with Robinson until March 10, 
March 11, and March 14, 2011 – the earliest attempt at communication with 
Robinson was made just three days before the Rule 29.15 motion was due on 
March 13.35  These three instances were the only attempts Hinkebein made to 
contact Robinson.36 
Hinkebein stopped communicating with Robinson entirely after March 
2011.37  “At the time the amended Rule 29.15 motion was due, [Hinkebein] 
had not yet decided [whether he would file the motion] or a statement in lieu 
of an amended motion.”38  Ultimately, Hinkebein never filed an amended 
motion or a statement in lieu of an amended motion.39  Robinson was re-
assigned to a different public defender, and a trial court subsequently found 
that Hinkebein had abandoned Robinson in his post-conviction relief action.40 
Christopher Hines was another client to whom Hinkebein was assigned 
as counsel, and he is also one of the six subjects of the instant case.41  
Hinkebein entered his appearance as Hines’ counsel on or about December 
 
 32. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 4-1.4. 
 33. Informant’s Brief, supra note 21, at 10. 
 34. Id.  Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15 provides a procedure by which per-
sons convicted of a felony may challenge the conviction on the basis 
 
that the conviction or sentence imposed violates the constitution and laws of 
this state or the constitution of the United States, including claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of trial and appellate counsel, that the court imposing the sen-
tence was without jurisdiction to do so, or that the sentence imposed was in 
excess of the maximum sentence authorized by law. 
 
MO. SUP. CT. R. 29.15(a). 
 35. Informant’s Brief, supra note 21, at 10. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 11. 
 40. Id. at 11–12. 
 41. Id. at 12. 
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21, 2012.42  Again, Hinkebein filed a motion for extension of time and was 
granted until March 5, 2013, to file an amended Rule 29.15 motion.43  
Hinkebein did not attempt to arrange telephone calls with Hines in prison 
until March 4, March 5, and March 6, 2013.44  Hinkebein spoke with Hines 
about his case for the first time on March 4 – one day before the amended 
motion was due.45  Hinkebein stopped communicating with Hines from 
March 2013 until August 15, 2013.46    
Hinkebein communicated with Hines on or about August 15, 2013, but 
only after Hines complained to Hinkebein’s supervisor that he had not heard 
from Hinkebein.47  Hinkebein never filed the amended motion or a statement 
in lieu of an amended motion.48  A trial court later found Hinkebein had 
abandoned Hines in his post-conviction relief action.49 
William Williams is also a subject of the instant case.50  Hinkebein en-
tered his appearance as Williams’ counsel on or about September 9, 2013.51  
Hinkebein was granted an extension of time to file an amended Rule 29.15 
motion until November 10, 2013.52  Hinkebein’s caseload timeline shows the 
earliest entry regarding work on Williams’ case was November 19, 2013, –
 more than a week after the amended motion was due.53  Hinkebein first 
spoke with Williams on November 21, 2013, – eleven days after the amended 
motion was due.54  Hinkebein did not speak with Williams after November 
21 and failed to speak with five of the six witnesses Williams identified dur-
ing the November 21 conversation.55  A trial court later found Hinkebein had 
abandoned Williams in his post-conviction relief action.56 
Hinkebein was also found to have abandoned Dustin Watson, Allen 
Giles, and Jeremy Arata under similar circumstances wherein Hinkebein 
failed to communicate with the aforementioned and failed to file the appro-
priate motions in their post-conviction relief actions, even after receiving 
extensions of time in each instance.57  Hinkebein had been admonished on 
three previous occasions by OCDC for the same violations he was accused of 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 13. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 14. 
 50. See id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 15. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 15–16. 
 56. Id. at 16. 
 57. Id. at 16–23. 
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in the instant case: lack of diligence and failure to reasonably communicate 
with clients.58 
In May of 2015, a disciplinary hearing panel was appointed to hear 
Hinkebein’s case.59  The hearing was held on July 26, 2016, in Jefferson City, 
Missouri.60  The panel issued its decision on October 31, 2016, concluding 
Hinkebein violated Missouri Rules 4-1.3 and 4-1.4.61  The panel recommend-
ed that Hinkebein “be placed on probation for one (1) year with conditions 
that he not violate the Missouri Rules . . . and that he report to the Chief Dis-
ciplinary Counsel, or his designee, every ninety (90) days.”62  The Supreme 
Court of Missouri, through its Order of February 28, 2017, ordered the case 
briefed and argued.63 
While Hinkebein freely admitted his violation of the Missouri Rules, he 
argued they were “primarily attributable to his severe health problems and 
excessive caseload.”64  Hinkebein argued these factors were “outside [his] 
control” and he had “no viable options related to his workload.”65 
Hinkebein called his health issues a “significant factor” in his inability 
to timely file motions in all six cases.66  Hinkebein’s medical records are 
sealed, and therefore details of his health problems are not publicly known, 
but according to Hinkebein’s brief, his serious health issues – which began in 
2004 – “became critical in 2010.”67  Hinkebein felt he was not functioning 
normally at a “reasonable [physical] level” until 2014.68  According to 
Hinkebein’s brief, unless he was “fairly critically ill or in the hospital,” 
Hinkebein was working approximately fifty hours per week despite his health 
problems.69  Even when hospitalized, Hinkebein worked on cases when he 
could.70 
Hinkebein argued that, in addition to his health issues, his excessive 
caseload was a factor in his inability to conform his conduct to the Missouri 
Rules.71  Hinkebein asserted he did not have the option to reject case assign-
ments unless it created a conflict of interest.72  Further, he asserted his supe-
 
 58. Id. at 7–8. 
 59. Id. at 8. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 9. 
 64. Respondent’s Brief at 8, In re Karl William Hinkebein, No. SC96089 (Mo. 
Sept. 12, 2017), 2017 WL 3195811, at *8.  
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 9. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 8. 
 72. Id. at 10 (“Respondent does not have the option to reject assignments, unless 
he has a conflict of interest.”).  Despite Hinkebein’s assertion, it should be noted that, 
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rior “really would not have had any options” even if Hinkebein had informed 
him that he was missing deadlines.73  Hinkebein believed that “[i]ndividual 
public defenders [were] trapped” – that despite large caseloads, rejecting an 
assignment would result in being fired.74  At the time of Hinkebein’s discipli-
nary hearing in July, his caseload was “approximately 110, which was higher 
than anyone else in his office.”75  Hinkebein “work[ed] more hours than any 
other attorney in [his] office,” and his supervisor testified, “[Hinkebein] is 
dedicated and has a very good work ethic.”76 
Two questions were presented for the Supreme Court of Missouri: 
whether Hinkebein violated any Missouri Rules, and if so, “what discipline, if 
any, was appropriate for those violations.”77  The Supreme Court of Missouri 
found that Hinkebein violated Rules 4-1.3 and 4-1.4(a) and that he should be 
disciplined.  The Court suspended Hinkebein’s license indefinitely but stayed 
the suspension, placing Hinkebein on probation for one year.78 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Section A of this Part gives a brief history of MSPD.  Section B of this 
Part details MSPD’s widespread and continuous problems with funding and 
excessive caseloads.  Section C then briefly explores pertinent Missouri 
Rules, while Section D details how those rules apply to public defenders in 
Missouri.  Section E then discusses the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions, including recognized aggravating and mitigating factors. 
A. Brief History of MSPD 
MSPD provides legal assistance to indigent defendants in Missouri who 
have been convicted or accused of crimes.79  The State of Missouri relies 
almost exclusively on MSPD to provide indigent defense services throughout 
the state, with MSPD providing representation in over 100,000 cases a year.80  
 
according to the Missouri Rules, excessive caseload can create a conflict of interest.  
Rule 4-1.7 states that a conflict of interest exists if “there is a significant risk that the 
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s re-
sponsibilities to another client.”  MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.7(2). 
 73. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 64, at 10. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 12. 
 76. Id. at 9. 
 77. Case Summaries for September 7, 2017, MO. CTS., 
https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=115187 (last visited Oct. 14, 2018). 
 78. Hinkebein Order, supra note 20.  
 79. Church v. Missouri, 268 F. Supp. 3d 992, 997 (W.D. Mo. 2017), rev’d, 913 
F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2019); see also MO. ST. PUB. DEFENDER, 
https://publicdefender.mo.gov/about-mspd/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2018). 
 80. Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 997.  This figure includes “new cases and cases 
carried over from previous years.”  Id. 
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MSPD has three separate divisions: the Trial Division, the Appellate/PCR 
Division, and the Capital Division.81  MSPD employs almost 380 attorneys, 
with most working in the Trial Division.82 
After the United States Supreme Court’s 1963 decision in Gideon af-
firmed that states have an obligation under the Sixth Amendment to provide 
indigent clients with representation,83 courts in Missouri appointed – but did 
not compensate – private attorneys to represent indigent defendants in Mis-
souri.84  In September 1971, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that after 
September 1972 it would no longer “compel the attorneys of Missouri to dis-
charge alone ‘a duty which constitutionally is the burden of the State.’”85  
The one-year window provided by the court was intended to give the Mis-
souri General Assembly an opportunity to provide a permanent solution to the 
problem.86 
A “blended system of local public defender offices and appointed coun-
sel programs”87 was utilized beginning in 1972 when the Missouri General 
Assembly passed chapter 600 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri (“RSMo”), 
which established the Public Defender Commission88 and secured paid coun-
sel for indigent defendants through “a system of full-time public defend-
ers.”89  By 1973, fourteen MSPD offices were present in Missouri, and that 
number grew to eighteen by 1977.90  However, by 1981, less than ten years 
after its inception, MSPD was already in difficult financial straits, running out 
of appropriated funds before the end of each fiscal year.91  When called upon 
to right the state’s wrongs – that is, its inability to pay its public defenders – 
the Supreme Court of Missouri concluded it did not have the power to compel 
the state to pay its attorneys but it did have the power to compel members of 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id.  “[R]oughly 313” public defenders work in the Trial Division.  Id. 
 83. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–45 (1963). 
 84. State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 875 (Mo. 
2009) (en banc). 
 85. State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Mo. 1971). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d at 875. 
 88. The purpose of the Public Defender Commission was to appoint full-time 
public defenders to four-year terms and oversee MSPD.  Our Distinguished History, 
MO. ST. PUB. DEFENDER, https://publicdefender.mo.gov/about-mspd/history-of-mspd/ 
(last visited Oct. 11, 2018). 
 89. ABA, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN THE STATE DEATH 
PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE MISSOURI DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT 168 (2012) 
[hereinafter ABA, DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS], 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/death_penalty_moratori
um/final_missouri_assessment_report.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 90. Our Distinguished History, supra note 88. 
 91. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d at 876. 
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The Missouri Bar to represent indigent defendants.92  The court directed at-
torneys to “represent indigent defendants until the legislature chose to fix the 
lack of funding.”93 
In 1982, House Bill 1169 (“HB1169”) overhauled the public defender 
system and created the Office of State Public Defender (“OSPD”).94  HB1169 
gave OSPD the authority to issue guidelines for indigence determination, 
outlined the legal services to be provided for qualified defendants entitled to 
counsel, authorized the appointment of private counsel in indigent defense 
cases for a set contract fee, and provided for the collection of costs relating to 
the representation of indigent clients.95 
In 1987, fifteen years after chapter 600 was enacted, twenty-three public 
defender offices existed in Missouri.96  Portions of the state not served by the 
existing public defender offices were served through state contracts with pri-
vate attorneys.97  According to MSPD’s website, MSPD was handling ap-
proximately 41,000 cases annually in the years around 1987.98 
In 1989, MSPD underwent another major overhaul in response to the 
rising cost of the contract counsel program and the increasing unwillingness 
of private attorneys “to take on indigent cases for the fees paid by . . . 
[MSPD].”99  Funding provided in 1989 allowed for the reorganization of the 
system into three distinct legal services divisions: (1) the Trial Division, (2) 
the Appellate/PCR Division, and (3) the Capital Division.100  This is the or-
ganization of MSPD that still exists as of the writing of this Note.101 
Currently, MSPD has “[thirty-three] district offices, [six] appellate sec-
tions, and [three] capital sections.”102  MSPD has continued to struggle with 
underfunding and excessive caseloads.  In 2017, a Boone County judge ap-
pointed thirty-seven private attorneys to represent indigent clients due to 
 
 92. Id. (“In State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, the Court was asked to compel the state 
to pay attorneys for their work.  617 S.W.2d 64, 64 (Mo. banc 1981).  At that time, 
this Court said that it did not have the power to do so but that it did have the power to 
turn to The Missouri Bar and compel lawyers to represent indigent defendants.”). 
 93. Id. (citing Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d at 67). 
 94. H.R. 1169, 81st Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1982) (codified as 
amended at MO. REV. STAT. § 600.019 (2016)); see also Our Distinguished History, 
supra note 88.  OSPD was created to be an independent arm of the state’s judicial 
branch.  Our Distinguished History, supra note 88. 
 95. Our Distinguished History, supra note 88. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. State ex rel. Missouri Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 876 
(Mo. 2009) (en banc); see also ABA, DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS, supra note 89, at 
169. 
 100. Our Distinguished History, supra note 88. 
 101. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d at 876; see Our Distinguished History, supra note 88. 
 102. Our Distinguished History, supra note 88. 
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MSPD’s excessive caseload and inability to take on more cases at the time.103  
In addition, Texas County has been completely privatized, meaning indigent 
defense is wholly provided by private attorneys who contract with MSPD.104  
These and MSPD’s other proliferative problems are explored further in Sec-
tion B below. 
B. A System in Crisis: Overworked and Underfunded 
MSPD has been the subject of increasingly sharp criticism in recent 
years, but intense concern has been present for decades.  MSPD has been 
independently evaluated on ten occasions since 1989.105  Lack of funding and 
excessive caseloads have been a concern in nearly all of these evaluations.106 
1. Funding 
The Missouri General Assembly provides funding for MSPD via annual 
appropriations that are subject to the approval of the Missouri governor.107  
Funds are almost exclusively pulled from Missouri’s general revenue.108  For 
fiscal year 2018, funding for MSPD constituted less than one-half of one per-
cent of Missouri’s general revenue.109 
 
 103. Caitlin Campbell, Boone County Court Appoints 37 Private Attorneys to 
Indigent Clients, COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (Oct. 4, 2017), 
http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/20171004/boone-county-court-appoints-37-
private-attorneys-to-indigent-clients. 
 104. Sky Chadde, Some Missouri Lawmakers Want to Privatize the Public De-




 105. Church v. Missouri, 268 F. Supp. 3d 992, 997 (W.D. Mo. 2017), rev’d, 913 
F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2019).  Assessments have been conducted by The Spangenberg 
Group in 1993 and 2005; the Missouri Senate Interim Committee in 2006; The Span-
genberg Group and the Center for Law, Justice, and Society at George Mason Univer-
sity in 2009; the U.S. Department of Justice – Bureau of Justice Statistics in 2010; the 
American Bar Association in 2010; the National Juvenile Defender Center in 2013; 
the American Bar Association and RubinBrown in 2014; the U.S. Department of 
Justice in 2015; and the Sixth Amendment Center in 2016.  Id. 
 106. See State ex rel. Missouri Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 876 
(Mo. 2009) (en banc).  Over the years, felony prosecutions tripled, but funding for 
MSPD has not increased commensurately.  Id. 
 107. ABA, DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS, supra note 89, at 168. 
 108. Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 997. 
 109. Id.; see also MISSOURI PUBLIC DEFENDER COMMISSION, FISCAL YEAR 2018 
ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2018), https://publicdefender.mo.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/MSPD-2018-Annual-Report.pdf [hereinafter FISCAL YEAR 
2018 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
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As of 2017, “Missouri [ranked] [forty-ninth] among the [fifty] states in 
funding for indigent defense.”110  A 2016 study by the Sixth Amendment 
Center determined “Missouri’s per capita spending on indigent defense is 
approximately one-third of the average of the [thirty-five] states surveyed.”111  
The Sixth Amendment Center found Missouri spent $6.20 per resident on 
indigent defense in fiscal year 2015 as compared to an average of $18.41 for 
the other thirty-five states surveyed.112  Reports by the National Juvenile De-
fender Center and the ABA called Missouri’s funding for public defense 
“woefully inadequate to guarantee the constitutional rights of indigent[] de-
fendants . . . .”113 
Even those working within MSPD have expressed concern that MSPD 
is violating its constitutional duties to indigent Missourians.114  In August 
2015, the Director of MSPD, Michael Barrett, wrote to then-Governor Jay 
Nixon and requested additional funds for MSPD, warning, “[T]he rights of 
poor Missourians are being violated throughout the state because MSPD’s 
resources are too few and the caseloads are too high.”115  Barrett requested 
$10 million in supplemental funds, but Governor Nixon denied this re-
quest.116  At the time of this request, numerous studies showed that MSPD’s 
inadequate funding was a threat to the constitutional rights of indigent de-
fendants in Missouri.117 
The Missouri Legislature attempted to provide reprieve for MSPD in 
fiscal year 2015, approving an extra $3.4 million in funding.118  However, 
then-Governor Nixon vetoed the funding.119  Even after the legislature over-
rode his veto, Nixon withheld the funds from MSPD.120  For fiscal year 2017, 
the legislature again attempted to provide additional funding to MSPD, ap-
proving $4.5 million in additional funds.121  Nixon again thwarted that effort, 
directing that MSPD receive only $1 million.122  In response to Nixon’s with-
holding, Barrett and the Public Defender Commission filed a lawsuit in the 
Circuit Court of Cole County, arguing the decision to withhold funds from 
MSPD violated the Missouri Constitution.123  Barrett stated in a press release 
 
 110. Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 997. 
 111. Id. (reporting on the Sixth Amendment Center study’s finding). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 997–98. 
 114. See id. at 998. 
 115. Id. at 997. 
 116. Id. at 997–98. 
 117. See assessments listed supra note 104. 
 118. Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 998. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Bob Watson, Missouri Public Defender System Sues over Funding Cuts, 
FULTON SUN (July 6, 2016), 
http://www.fultonsun.com/news/missouri/story/2016/jul/06/missouri-public-defender-
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regarding the lawsuit that “[t]hroughout his two terms in office, Gov[ernor] 
Nixon has seldom passed on an opportunity to weaken a poor person’s consti-
tutional right to counsel.”124  Cole County Circuit Judge Jon Beetem dis-
missed the lawsuit, holding Nixon had the legal authority to withhold the 
funds.125 
Many may remember when Barrett – frustrated with Nixon’s repeated 
refusal to approve funding for MSPD – assigned Nixon to a case under a state 
law provision that allows the Director of MSPD, in extraordinary circum-
stances, to “delegate” legal representation to any member of the state bar of 
Missouri.126  In looking to assign cases to attorneys outside of MSPD, Barrett 
stated that he would start with “the one attorney in the state who not only 
created [the] problem, but is in a unique position to address it.”127  Nixon 
ultimately did not have to obey Barrett’s appointment of him to a criminal 
case (the power to appoint attorneys to criminal cases rests with courts 
alone),128 but a message was sent nonetheless. 
In 2017, Barrett stated, “If you go back three years, $6 million has been 
left on the table for [MSPD].”129  In fiscal year 2017, 17.99% of MSPD attor-
 
system-sues-over-funding-cuts/631465/.  See generally Barrett v. Nixon, No. 16AC-
CC00290, 2016 WL 8970077 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 2016). 
 124. Public Defender Files Legal Challenge to Governor’s Withhold Actions, MO. 
ST. PUB. DEFENDER (July 13, 2016), https://publicdefender.mo.gov/public-
information/mspd-in-the-news/pdfileslegalchallenge/; see also Watson, supra note 
123.   
 125. Barrett, 2016 WL 8970077, at *2; see also Bob Watson, Public Defenders’ 
Budget in Limbo, NEWS TRIB. (June 10, 2017), 
http://www.newstribune.com/news/local/story/2017/jun/10/public-defenders-budget-
limbo/677489/. 
 126. Letter from Michael Barrett, Dir. of Mo. Pub. Def. Sys., to Jay Nixon, Gov-
ernor of Mo. (Aug. 2, 2016), 
https://bloximages.newyork1.vip.townnews.com/stltoday.com/content/tncms/assets/v
3/editorial/c/ff/cff01561-2e8e-5d40-99bd-d016eab58a13/57a2ace631005.pdf.pdf. 
[hereinafter Letter from Michael Barrett to Jay Nixon].  Barrett was invoking his 
power under MO. REV. STAT.  § 600.042.5 (2016) (giving the Director of MSPD the 
authority to “[d]elegate the legal representation of an eligible person to any member 
of the state bar of Missouri”).  Ultimately, a Cole County Circuit Court judge ruled 
that the authority vested in the Director of MSPD under section 600.042.5 does not 
include the ability to appoint Nixon or any other private attorney, to a case – only 
courts can do that.  See Celeste Bott, Court Rules Public Defender Can’t Appoint 




 127. Letter from Michael Barrett to Jay Nixon, supra note 126. 
 128. Bott, supra note 126.  
 129. Watson, supra note 125.  Barrett noted that then-Governor Greitens contin-
ued the withholding of $3.5 million in appropriations initiated by Governor Nixon.  
Id. 
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neys left MSPD.130  MSPD stated, “A significant contributing factor to turno-
ver is the salaries MSPD is able to pay [assistant public defenders].131  For 
fiscal year 2018, a budget committee was willing to grant MSPD a $6.8 mil-
lion funding increase, but then-Governor Eric Greitens approved an increase 
of only $1 million.132  However, in its Fiscal Year 2018 Report, MSPD noted 
a $3.5 million core restoration in addition to the aforementioned $1 million 
increase, which resulted in a net $4.5 million increase in available general 
revenue funds.133  There were no withholdings in fiscal year 2018.134  For 
fiscal year 2019, MSPD was appropriated funds to increase the salaries of 
public defenders.135 
2. Excessive Caseload Burden 
In 2009, a report by The Spangenberg Group and the Center for Justice, 
Law and Society at George Mason University concluded that MSPD’s case-
load burden was “a crisis so serious it has pushed the entire criminal justice 
system in Missouri to the brink of collapse.”136  Resources – including staff – 
have been a concern for MSPD since 1993 when The Spangenberg Group 
concluded that MSPD “lack[ed] the necessary resources to provide competent 
representation” and that “[t]he legal staff need[ed] to be increased as soon as 
possible.”137 
Concerns had not dissipated more than ten years later in 2005 when the 
Missouri Bar Association created a Public Defender Taskforce (“Taskforce”) 
to assist the Public Defender Commission in addressing the deficiencies of 
MSPD.138  The Taskforce commissioned The Spangenberg Group to conduct 
another study on MSPD in 2005.139  The Spangenberg Group again found the 
 
 130. MISSOURI PUBLIC DEFENDER COMMISSION, MISSOURI STATE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER SYSTEM BUDGET REQUEST FISCAL YEAR 2019, at 18 (2017), 
https://oa.mo.gov/sites/default/files/FY_2019_Public_%20Defender_Budget_Request
.pdf [hereinafter BUDGET REQUEST FISCAL YEAR 2019]. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Marshall Griffin, A Look at How Missouri Will Spend $27.8 Billion, Should 
Gov. Greitens Approve, KCUR89.3 (May 7, 2017), http://kcur.org/post/look-how-
missouri-will-spend-278-billion-should-gov-greitens-approve#stream/0. 
 133. FISCAL YEAR 2018 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 109.  
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. ROBERT L. SPANGENBERG, DAVID J. NEWHOUSE & JON B. GOULD, 




 137. Church v. Missouri, 268 F. Supp. 3d 992, 998 (W.D. Mo. 2017) (first two 
alterations in original), rev’d, 913 F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2019). 
 138. Id. 
 139. See id. 
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operations of MSPD troubling, concluding that hardworking public defenders 
were routinely failing to comply with MSPD Guidelines140 and the Missouri 
Rules due to excessive caseloads.141  A 2006 Missouri Senate report found 
that from 2000 to 2006, MSPD’s caseload increased by more than 12,000 
cases, but there had been no proportional additions made to its staff.142  
MSPD’s caseload crisis has continued to grow.143 
The Missouri Bar Association retained The Spangenberg Group again in 
2009 to conduct yet another report on MSPD.  The report, summarized here 
by District Court Judge Nanette K. Laughrey, found that 
public defender workloads had worsened since its 2005 report and, as 
a result of those workloads, public defenders were failing to (1) con-
duct prompt interviews of their clients following arrest, (2) spend suf-
ficient time interviewing and counseling their clients, (3) advocate ef-
fectively for pretrial release, (4) conduct thorough investigations of 
their cases, (5) pursue formal and informal discovery, (6) file appro-
priate and essential pleadings and motions, (7) conduct necessary legal 
research, and (8) prepare adequately for pretrial hearings, trial, and 
sentencing.144 
Concerned with MSPD’s increasingly complex and outsized caseload 
and the lack of an increase in public defenders to go with it, the Public De-
fender Commission enacted a “caseload protocol” regulation, which took 
effect in 2008.145  The protocol allowed “a district defender office to decline 
additional appointments when it has been certified as being on limited availa-
bility after exceeding its caseload capacity for at least three consecutive cal-
endar months.”146  In 2012, the Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the validi-
ty of this protocol.147  Nonetheless, MSPD offices that attempted to turn away 
cases triggered “resistance from prosecutors, judges, and legislators.”148 
 
 140. “MSPD Guidelines for Representation [were] adopted by the Missouri State 
Public Defender Commission [and] set out the Commission’s expectations of its at-
torneys in order to meet the [ethical and constitutional] standards for effective repre-
sentation of clients served by Missouri Public Defenders.”  BUDGET REQUEST FISCAL 
YEAR 2019, supra note 130, at 3. 
 141. Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 998. 
 142. State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 877 (Mo. 
2009) (en banc). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 998. 
 145. State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 599, 599 
n.4 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 146. Id. at 597. 
 147. See id. at 612.  However, subsections of the rule as originally promulgated 
have been held invalid by the Supreme Court of Missouri.  Pratte, 298 S.W.3d at 890 
(rejecting a public defender office may decline to take on any new appointments until 
the caseload falls below the commission’s standard, but “allowing a public defender 
15
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Legislators even threatened to privatize the entire system if MSPD con-
tinued to turn away cases.149  The legislature did not make good on its threat, 
but it nonetheless crippled MSPD’s efforts to limit its excessive caseload.  In 
2013, the legislature passed section 600.062, RSMo, which explicitly denied 
the Director of MSPD and the Public Defender Commission “the authority to 
limit the availability of a district office or [any MSPD public defender] to 
accept cases based on a determination that the office has exceeded a caseload 
standard.”150  Section 600.062 dictated that unless a court provided prior ap-
proval, MSPD could not refuse to provide representation to indigent defend-
ants.151  Until 2017, MSPD had not refused to take on cases “in any con-
sistent or systematic way” since the passage of section 600.062.152 
A 2014 report once again highlighted MSPD’s deficiencies.  The ABA 
and RubinBrown, an accounting firm, tasked researchers with calculating the 
minimum number of hours an appointed counsel would need to devote to 
various kinds of cases in order to meet constitutionally permissible standards 
of representation.153  MSPD data from 2013 was then used to determine 
whether these standards were being met.154  On average, no single category of 
case met the minimum standards calculated by the ABA and RubinBrown.155  





office to decline categories of cases is contrary to [section 600.042.4(3)] and is inva-
lid.”). 
 148. Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 999.  “In some circuits, cases that were turned 
away were assigned to non-MSPD attorneys with no criminal defense experience who 
were not compensated for their time.”  Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. MO. REV. STAT. § 600.062 (2016). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 999.  In October 2017, MSPD’s District 13 
stopped accepting new cases and created a “wait list.”  See infra notes 254–70 and 
accompanying text.  As of the writing of this Note, the District is still utilizing the 
wait list system and has not yet begun to accept new cases.  See infra notes 254–70 
and accompanying text. 
 153. Id.  See generally RUBINBROWN, THE MISSOURI PROJECT: A STUDY OF THE 




 154. RUBINBROWN, supra note 153, at 15. 
 155. See id.; see also Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 999. 
 156. See RUBINBROWN, supra note 153, at 6, 16; see also Church, 268 F. Supp. 
3d at 999. 
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Table 1. Hours Needed and Spent by Type of Case157 
 












Min. to Meet 
Constitutional 
Obligations 




hours 11.7 hours 9.8 hours 








hours 2.3 hours 1.4 hours 
Difference 22.1 38.9 20.6 38.2 9.4 8.4 
 
The study results showed that, throughout the state, MSPD offices were 
functioning far beyond their workload capacity.  In the Trial Division, public 
defenders “were able to devote the minimum required hours to only 2.4% of 
all A/B Felony cases (or 97 out of 4,127 total A/B felony cases) and 1.4% of 
C/D felony cases (or 311 out of 21,491 total C/D felony cases).”158 
These numbers reflect that, in one year alone, thousands of indigent de-
fendants in Missouri were appointed attorneys who could not devote enough 
time to their cases to meet constitutional standards of representation.  In addi-
tion to a constitutional crisis, MSPD has acknowledged its attorneys are vio-
lating its own MSPD Guidelines for Representation.159  In its budget request 
for fiscal year 2019, MSPD stated that “[case] overload has forced lawyers 
and investigators alike to cut corners, skip steps, and make on-the-fly triage 
decisions in order to keep up with the deluge of cases coming in the door.  As 
a result, effectiveness in many of these cases is seriously compromised.”160  
For fiscal year 2019, the General Assembly granted MSPD $49,613,083 – a 
roughly $4 million increase over fiscal year 2018 but still far below the 
$75,392,296 MSPD requested in order to provide constitutionally adequate 
representation.161 
 
 157. The information in this table is generated from the results of the 2014 Ru-
binBrown report.  RUBINBROWN, supra note 153, at 6.  All data from the minimum 
constitutional obligations row can be found at id., while all the data in the time spent 
by MSPD row can be found at id. at 16. 
 158. Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 999. 
 159. Id. at 998. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Lack of Adequate Funding Forces Missouri Public Defenders to Shortchange 
Constitutional Rights, ACLU (May 17, 2018), https://www.aclu-
mo.org/en/news/lack-adequate-funding-forces-missouri-public-defenders-
shortchange-constitutional-rights; see also, MO. OFFICE OF ADMIN., FISCAL YEAR 19 
APPROPRIATION BILL BY DEPARTMENT 4 (2019), 
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In 2017, a class action lawsuit was filed against the State of Missouri 
and then-Governor of Missouri Eric Greitens, alleging Missouri had “failed to 
meet its constitutional obligation to provide indigent defendants with mean-
ingful representation.”162  Five plaintiffs sought relief on behalf of themselves 
and for all indigent persons who were at the time, or would be during the 
pendency of the litigation, subject to formal charges that carried penalties of 
imprisonment, confinement, detention, or incarceration in a Missouri state 
court and who were eligible to be represented by MSPD.163  Following the 
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri’s denial, in part, of 
Missouri’s and Greitens’ motions to dismiss, the case was appealed to the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.164  The Eighth Circuit heard 
oral arguments on April 10, 2018.165  On January 10, 2019, the Eighth Circuit 
issued its opinion, reversing the district court’s denial of the motions to dis-
miss and remanding to the district court for further proceedings.166  The 
Eighth Circuit’s opinion exemplifies the difficulty that inheres in seeking 
systemic reform through lawsuits that name the state itself or the state’s gov-
ernor as a defendant – absent special circumstances, both are virtually always 




 162. Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 997. 
 163. Id. at 1003–08. 
 164. Id. at 1023; Dennis Crouch, A Few Eighth Circuit Cases, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 
9, 2018), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/04/eighth-circuit-cases.html (“The appeal 
by the State argues for immunity.  In particular, the Government argues that: (a) the 
Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity bar Plaintiffs’ claims 
against the State of Missouri; (b) Plaintiffs’ claims against Missouri’s Governor do 
not fall within the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity; and (c) . . . abso-
lute legislative immunity bars Plaintiffs’ claims against the Governor.”). 
 165. See Case Number 17-2857: Shondel Church v. State of Missouri, EIGHTH 
CIR. CT. OF APPEALS, http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/genrlSrch.pl?pa_type=cs 
(search 17-2857 in case number box and click submit.  On the next page click the 
“play” hyperlink next to “Oral Argument 04/10/2018.”) (last visited Dec. 28, 2018). 
 166. Church v. Missouri, 913 F.3d 736, 754 (8th Cir. 2019) (finding Missouri’s 
general sovereign immunity foreclosed suit against the State absent its consent, in-
cluding Plaintiffs suit seeking prospective equitable relief; Governor’s actions were 
not basis for an Ex parte Young action and therefore he was entitled to sovereign 
immunity; and Governor’s authority to withhold appropriations was a legislative act 
which conferred upon him legislative immunity even if sovereign immunity did not 
apply).  
 167. State officials are not entitled to sovereign immunity and are not shielded 
from official-capacity suits seeking injunctive relief when government officials at-
tempt to enforce an unconstitutional law.  Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).  In 
addition, states can waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity when they remove an 
action from state to federal court.  See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 
535 U.S. 613, 624 (2002).  However, removing an action from state to federal court 
does not waive a state’s general sovereign immunity.  See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 
706, 713 (1999) (“[S]overeign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is 
18
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C. Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct: MSPD Attorneys’ Contin-
uing Violations 
The Missouri Rules require attorneys to hold themselves to certain 
standards of conduct.168  The purpose of the Missouri Rules and any attorney 
discipline that may flow from their violation is to “protect the public and the 
administration of justice.”169 
The Missouri Rules relating to diligence and communication are particu-
larly relevant to attorneys who are facing excessive caseloads.  Rule 4-1.3 
mandates that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness 
in representing a client.”170  Rule 4-1.4 dictates that: 
 
(a) A lawyer shall: 
(1) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the 
matter; 
(2) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; 
and 
(3) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the 
lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows the client expects as-
sistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or 
other law. 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary 
to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the repre-
sentation.171 
Despite the individual obligations of each lawyer under the Missouri 
Rules, MSPD’s excessive caseload prevents public defenders from meeting 
regularly with their clients and often results in meeting meaningfully with a 
client for the first time only weeks before the start of the client’s trial.172 
Moreover, time constraints and heavy caseloads prevent proper investi-
gation of clients’ cases and prevent adequate preparation for trial and plea 
negotiations.173  Most public defenders do not have adequate time to review 
and analyze discovery early enough in a case to make meaningful decisions 
 
limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.”); Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State 
Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753 (2002) (“[T]he sovereign immunity enjoyed by the 
States extends beyond the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment.”).   
 168. See generally MO. SUP. CT. R. 4. 
 169. See Missouri Attorney Discipline System, MO. OFF. OF CHIEF DISCIPLINARY 
COUNSEL, https://www.mochiefcounsel.org/. 
 170. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.3. 
 171. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.4. 
 172. Church v. Missouri, 268 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1001 (W.D. Mo. 2017), rev’d, 913 
F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2019). 
 173. Id. 
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regarding whom to depose and when further investigation is necessary.174  
Depositions are taken in only a “small fraction” of cases, leaving potentially 
crucial information outside of the public defender’s knowledge.175  In short, 
public defenders in MSPD are routinely violating their ethical obligations 
under the Missouri Rules. 
D. The ABA and the Supreme Court of Missouri: “No Exception for 
Public Defenders” 
In 2006, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility issued Formal Opinion 06-411 (“Formal Opinion”)176 – its “first 
ever ethics opinion concerning the obligations of lawyers, burdened with 
excessive caseloads, who provide indigent defense representation.”177  ABA 
ethics opinions must be based on the ABA Rules of Professional Conduct 
(“ABA Rules”), and thus, there was “never any real doubt” about what the 
Formal Opinion would say regarding professional obligations in the midst of 
excessive caseloads.178  The Formal Opinion unequivocally stated that there 
are “no exceptions” for public defenders;179 “all lawyers have a duty to fur-
nish competent and diligent [representation].”180 
Further, the Formal Opinion held that when an excessive caseload or 
soon-to-be excessive caseload prevents competent and diligent representation, 
new cases cannot be accepted, and the onus is on the lawyer to request that 
new appointments be stopped.181  If an attorney already has an excessive 
caseload preventing competent and diligent representation, the attorney 
should “move to withdraw from a sufficient number of cases” to bring their 
representation into conformance with their ethical obligations once again.182 
The Supreme Court of Missouri has also weighed in on public defend-
ers’ professional conduct responsibilities in the face of extreme caseloads, 
 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-411 (2006), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defe
ndants/ls_sclaid_def_ethics_opinion_defender_caseloads_06_441.authcheckdam.pdf 
[hereinafter Formal Opinion]. 
 177. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFS., EIGHT 
GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE RELATED TO EXCESSIVE WORKLOADS 1 (2009), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defe
ndants/ls_sclaid_def_eight_guidelines_of_public_defense.authcheckdam.pdf [herein-
after Eight Guidelines].  See generally Formal Opinion, supra note 176. 
 178. NORMAN LEFSTEIN, ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND 
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN 
PUBLIC DEFENSE 32 (2011). 
 179. Formal Opinion, supra note 176, at 3. 
 180. Eight Guidelines, supra note 177, at 1. 
 181. Formal Opinion, supra note 176, at 4–5. 
 182. Id. at 9. 
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echoing the ABA’s conclusion in the Formal Opinion.  In Missouri Public 
Defender Commission v. Waters, the court held that “no exception exists to 
the [Missouri Rules] for lawyers who represent indigent persons.”183  Further, 
the Supreme Court of Missouri held that “[c]ounsel violates [Rules 4-1.1, 4-
1.3, and 4-1.4 when] she accepts a case that results in a caseload so high it 
impairs her ability to provide competent representation, to act with reasonable 
diligence, and to keep the client reasonably informed.”184  Therefore, “public 
defenders are risking their own professional lives” when they are appointed to 
– and when they accept – an excessive number of cases.185 
Public defenders do not bear ethical obligations alone.  Supervisors re-
sponsible for public defenders have ethical responsibilities when their subor-
dinates are violating – or are about to violate – rules of professional con-
duct.186  The Formal Opinion recognized the duty of supervisors in manageri-
al positions in circumstances where subordinate lawyers face excessive case-
loads.187  Supervisors, and indeed even the top echelons of defender services, 
are required to make “reasonable efforts” to ensure subordinate lawyers com-
ply with applicable ethical rules.188  Supervisors should monitor caseloads to 
ensure lawyers can deliver competent and diligent representation.189  When 
supervisors are aware that a lawyer has an excessive caseload, supervisors 
have a duty to take remedial action, and failure to do so makes supervisors 
themselves responsible for the professional conduct violations of subordinate 
lawyers.190 
Further, when a subordinate lawyer feels the resolution of a manager is 
not reasonable with respect to remedial measures taken or not taken, the For-
mal Opinion commands the subordinate lawyer to continue up the chain of 
command, “perhaps leading to the matter being brought to the head of the 
defender program and even to the program’s governing board, if there is 
one.”191  In 2009, the ABA promulgated Eight Guidelines of Public Defense 
Related to Excessive Workloads (“Eight Guidelines”), which advised public 
defender programs, like MSPD, to employ “a supervision program that con-
tinuously monitors the workloads of its lawyers to assure that all essential 
tasks . . . are performed” and reiterated the duties of those with “management 
responsibilities.”192 
 
 183. State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Mo. 
2012) (en banc). 
 184. Id. at 607. 
 185. Id. at 608 (quoting State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 
870, 880 (Mo. 2009) (en banc)). 
 186. See Formal Opinion, supra note 176, at 1. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 8. 
 190. Id. 
 191. LEFSTEIN, supra note 178, at 32. 
 192. Eight Guidelines, supra note 177, at 2. 
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E. The ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
In 1986, the ABA promulgated the ABA Standards in an attempt to 
make lawyer discipline effective by establishing clear standards for sanc-
tions.193  The ABA Standards set forth a “comprehensive system of sanc-
tions” designed to promote “thorough, rational consideration of all factors 
relevant to imposing a sanction in an individual case.”194  The ABA Stand-
ards seek to ensure that factors are given appropriate weight in light of the 
purposes of lawyer discipline and that “only relevant aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstances are considered at the appropriate time.”195  The Joint 
Committee on Professional Sanctions (“Sanctions Committee”) – the com-
mittee responsible for promulgating the ABA Standards – “adopted a model 
[for imposing sanctions] that looks first at the ethical duty and to whom it is 
owed[] and then at the lawyer’s mental state and the amount of injury caused 
by the lawyer’s misconduct.”196 
The model developed by the Sanctions Committee asks courts to answer 
the following questions when imposing sanctions: 
(1) What ethical duty did the lawyer violate [– a] duty to the client, the 
public, the legal system, or the profession?[;] (2) What was the law-
yer’s mental state [– d]id the lawyer act intentionally, knowingly, or 
negligently?[;] (3) What was the extent of the actual or potential injury 
caused by the lawyer’s misconduct [– w]as there a serious or poten-
tially serious injury?[;] and (4) Are there any aggravating or mitigat-
ing circumstances?197 
The ABA Standards assume the most important ethical duties are those 
to the client, including: “the duty of loyalty,” the duty to preserve client prop-
erty, the duty to “maintain client confidences,” the duty to “avoid conflicts of 
interest,” “the duty of diligence,” “the duty of competence,” and “the duty of 
candor.”198  As for a lawyer’s mental state, the ABA Standards assert that 
[t]he most culpable mental state is [that of] intent[ –] when the lawyer 
acts with the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular 
result.  The [second] most culpable mental state is that of knowledge[ 
– ] when the lawyer acts with conscious awareness of the nature or at-
tendant circumstances of his or her conduct [but] without the con-
 
 193. ABA, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 2 (1992) [hereinafter 
STANDARDS FOR SANCTIONS], 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibi
lity/sanction_standards.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 3. 
 197. Id. at 4–5. 
 198. Id. at 5. 
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scious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.  The 
least culpable mental state is negligence[ –] when a lawyer fails to be 
aware of a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will 
follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of care that a 
reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation.199 
The extent of the injury is “defined by the type of duty violated and the 
extent of actual or potential harm.”200  There are various levels of injury in 
the model – “serious injury,” “injury,” and “little or no injury.” 
Under the ABA Standards, answers to the first three questions regarding 
duty, mental state, and injury shape the baseline sanction that could be im-
posed.201  After making an initial determination as to the appropriate sanc-
tion, aggravating and mitigating factors are then considered and may have the 
effect of increasing or decreasing the appropriate sanction.202 
The Sanctions Committee outlined specific aggravating and mitigating 
factors.  “Aggravating factors include: (a) prior disciplinary offenses; (b) 
dishonest or selfish motive; (c) a pattern of misconduct; (d) multiple offenses 
. . .” and more.203  “Mitigating factors include: (a) absence of a prior discipli-
nary record; (b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (c) personal or emo-
tional problems; . . . (e) full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board; . . . 
(f) inexperience in the practice of law; . . . (h) physical disability; . . .” and 
more.204  The existence of an excessive caseload is not a mitigating factor 
articulated in the ABA Standards.205 
 
 199. Id. at 6. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 4–5. 
 202. Id. at 6. 
 203. Id. at 17.  Other aggravating factors include: 
 
(e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing 
to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency; 
(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices 
during the disciplinary process; 
(g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; 
(h) vulnerability of victim; 
(i) substantial experience in the practice of law; 
(j) indifference to making restitution; 
(k) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of controlled substances. 
 
Id. 
 204. Id. at 18.  Other mitigating factors include: 
 
(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of 
misconduct; . . . 
(g) character or reputation; . . . 
(i) mental disability or chemical dependency including alcoholism or drug 
abuse when: 
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IV. INSTANT DECISION 
It was undisputed by both OCDC and Hinkebein that Hinkebein violated 
Missouri Rules 4-1.3 and 4-1.4(a).206  Therefore, the material question in the 
instant case was the severity of the discipline to be imposed.207  The Supreme 
Court of Missouri heard oral arguments on the matter from Alan Pratzel, 
Chief Disciplinary Counsel for OCDC, and Sara Rittman of Rittman Law 
LLC, attorney for Hinkebein.  Pratzel asked the court to “suspend 
Hinkebein’s law license with no leave to apply for reinstatement for one 
year.”208  Hinkebein argued his professional conduct violations warranted 
only a reprimand.209 
A. Argument 
Pratzel argued the ABA Standards on which the court regularly relies 
dictated a baseline sanction of suspension in the instant case.210  According to 
ABA Standard 4.42, a suspension is warranted if an attorney acts with a 
knowing lack of diligence that causes injury or potential injury to a client.211  
ABA Standard 4.42 also dictates that suspension should be the baseline sanc-
tion when a lawyer “engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or po-
 
(1) there is medical evidence that the respondent is affected by a chemical 
dependency or mental disability; 
(2) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct; 
(3) the respondent’s recovery from the chemical dependency or mental 
disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of suc-
cessful rehabilitation; and 
(4) the recovery arrested the misconduct and recurrence of that miscon-
duct is unlikely. 
(j) delay in disciplinary proceedings; 
(k) imposition of other penalties or sanctions; 
(l) remorse; 
(m) remoteness of prior offenses. 
 
Id. 
 205. See id. 
 206. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 64, at 7; see also Oral Argument at 00:30–46, 
02:31–36, In re Karl William Hinkebein, No. SC96089 (Mo. Sept. 12, 2017), 
https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=117413. 
 207. See Oral Argument, supra note 206, at 02:38–42. 
 208. Case Summaries for September 7, 2017, supra note 77.  
 209. Id. 
 210. See Oral Argument, supra note 206, at 02:43–53. 
 211. STANDARDS FOR SANCTIONS, supra note 193, at 12 (“Suspension is generally 
appropriate when: (a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and 
causes injury or potential injury to a client, or (b) a lawyer engages in a pattern of 
neglect [and] causes injury or potential injury to a client.”); see also Oral Argument, 
supra note 206, at 02:53–03:03. 
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tential injury to a client.”212  Pratzel argued those criteria had been met in the 
instant case in that “six of [Hinkebein’s] clients were deprived of necessary 
and appropriate legal services due to [Hinkebein’s] neglect of their cases.”213  
Pratzel argued Hinkebein was “clearly knowing” in that he was “con-
scious[ly] aware[] of the nature and circumstances of [his] misconduct.”214 
Pratzel conceded that while there was arguably no injury in the instant 
case because all six clients were able to eventually file Rule 29.15 motions215 
and none were meritorious, there was a potential for injury because had any 
one of them been meritorious, relief for that client would have been delayed 
and “placed in jeopardy by the fact [Hinkebein] neglected their [case].”216  
Pratzel described aggravators in the consideration of sanctions as the three 
previous admonitions of Hinkebein – the “pattern of misconduct, [the fact] 
there were multiple offenses, and [the fact that] the victims . . . were vulnera-
ble.”217 
Pratzel acknowledged there were mitigating factors to be considered in 
Hinkebein’s case, including that Hinkebein gave full and free disclosure, 
Hinkebein was cooperative and remorseful, “and [Hinkebein] suffers from a 
physical disability.”218  However, Pratzel noted that five out of the six times 
Hinkebein failed to file the required motions for his clients he had been out of 
the hospital for months.219  Moreover, Pratzel pointed out Hinkebein failed to 
communicate with clients until the deadline for the required motions had 
passed and hospitalization is not an adequate excuse for this sort of miscon-
duct.220 
Pratzel took special effort to argue that excessive caseload should not be 
a mitigating factor when considering the appropriate sanction.221  Pratzel 
noted that Hinkebein’s brief argued his excessive caseload was a factor in his 
misconduct and further that Hinkebein’s brief cited studies that concluded 
public defenders in MSPD have excessive caseloads that burden their ability 
to provide diligent representation.222  Pratzel stated the “apparent point” of 
these arguments was to have “the court treat an excessive caseload as a miti-
gating factor, if not an outright defense[,] in this case and any case involving 
a public defender who neglects client matters.”223  When pushed by the court 
to explain why he thought excessive caseload was not relevant to sanc-
 
 212. STANDARDS FOR SANCTIONS, supra note 193, at 12; see also Oral Argument, 
supra note 206, at 03:03–08. 
 213. See also Oral Argument, supra note 206, at 03:13–19. 
 214. Id. at 03:43–49. 
 215. See supra note 34. 
 216. Oral Argument, supra note 206, at 04:00–38. 
 217. Id. at 04:40–05:05. 
 218. Id. at 05:06–21. 
 219. Id. at 12:23–48. 
 220. Id. at 12:54–13:10. 
 221. See id. at 06:00–23. 
 222. See id. at 05:41–6:00. 
 223. Id. at 06:00–14. 
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tions,224 Pratzel argued that the ABA Standards did not make excessive case-
load a mitigating factor and further that allowing excessive caseload to miti-
gate sanctions would make for a “slippery slope.”225 
Pratzel opined that not only would such mitigation extend to all public 
defenders engaged in misconduct but it might then possibly apply to any at-
torney with a heavy caseload, including private counsel and even prosecu-
tors.226  Pratzel emphasized to the court that any significant mitigation grant-
ed should be based on Hinkebein’s physical disability and should not be 
based on the claim of excessive caseload.227 
On behalf of Hinkebein, Rittman argued Hinkebein was plagued by “se-
vere and chronic physical health problems coupled with a broken public de-
fender system.”228  The court, however, was skeptical of the latter half of 
Rittman’s argument and expressed that it saw no difference between public 
defenders and young associates at big firms who are overburdened by the 
work they are asked to perform.229  Notably, one judge remarked, “I see a big 
problem . . . if we allow attorneys to say my boss made me do it because 
when they take the oath to follow the [Missouri] Rules . . . , sometimes that 
means not taking a case, and sometimes that means taking a different job.”230 
In response to this statement, Rittman asked the court to consider what 
benefit it would be to either the public or MSPD for a qualified, experienced, 
and skilled lawyer to quit.231  The court responded that Hinkebein could have 
done much in between the two extremes of quitting and failing to represent 
his clients, including letting a supervisor know the dire situation he was in.232  
Rittman replied that Hinkebein’s supervisor already knew of his situation and 
reminded the court that the supervisor had in fact testified he would not have 
been able to do anything about Hinkebein’s caseload, regardless of a com-
plaint by Hinkebein.233  The court then challenged: “Is that acceptable? To 
not say anything because you think you’ll be rejected as opposed to trying [to 
bring this to a supervisor for remedial measures]?”234  The court further noted 
that if the supervisor failed to act, the supervisor himself would face conse-
quences for condoning ineffective assistance of counsel.235 
 
 224. Id. at 07:21–26. 
 225. Id. at 07:43–08:31. 
 226. Id. at 08:10–09:33. 
 227. Id. at 15:21–45. 
 228. Id. at 17:42–53. 
 229. Id. at 18:06 –19. 
 230. Id. at 18:35–55. 
 231. Id. at 19:13–39. 
 232. Id. at 19:43–20:23.  “The fear that they might not like that and there might be 
some retribution – I question if that’s reasonable – but that’s a long way from saying 
‘I’ve just got to quit.’”  Id. at 20:10–23. 
 233. Id. at 21:43–48. 
 234. Id. at 21:23–29. 
 235. Id. at 21:48–55. 
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Rittman ultimately argued that excessive caseload should be considered 
by the court in determining sanctions for Hinkebein but that the court should 
also consider the “compelling” mitigating factor of Hinkebein’s physical 
health and critical illness.236  Rittman noted Hinkebein’s previous admoni-
tions were seven years ago,237 and the potential for harm in the cases at bar 
was not great because abandonment routinely takes place, and courts routine-
ly allow newly-appointed counsel to file amended motions out-of-time.238  
Rittman concluded by asserting that suspension would be “clearly excessive” 
for Hinkebein in light of his health problems and his caseload.239  In rebuttal, 
Pratzel argued that if the court found Hinkebein’s health problems were such 
that they sufficiently mitigated his misconduct to probation, the court should 
impose a stayed suspension with probation, but in no case should it consider 
excessive caseload or status as a public defender as a mitigating factor.240 
B. Decision 
The Supreme Court of Missouri found Hinkebein violated Missouri 
Rules 4-1.3 and 4-1.4(a) and that he should be disciplined.241  After consider-
ing its previous decisions, the ABA Standards, as well as all aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, the court suspended Hinkebein’s license indefinite-
ly but stayed the suspension and placed Hinkebein on probation for a period 
of one year.242  While the court wrote that it “consider[ed] . . . aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances,” it made no mention of specific factors that 
proved particularly influential to its decision to impose a stayed suspension 
and probation.243 
V. COMMENT 
The overburdened and underfunded MSPD is collapsing on itself.  
While the indigent defendants who rely on this system are the persons we 
should be first and foremost concerned about, public defenders are also in a 
difficult position.  Section A of this Part discusses the unlikelihood of exces-
sive caseload becoming a mitigating factor in ethical violations for public 
defenders.  Section B of this Part highlights the inability of the ABA’s man-
dates to solve the pressing problems facing MSPD’s public defenders.  Sec-
tion C then turns to a discussion of the ramifications of Hinkebein.  Section D 
 
 236. Id. at 25:35–26:36. 
 237. Id. at 26:37–27:05. 
 238. See id. at 30:01–49. 
 239. Id. at 31:09–32:30. 
 240. Id. at 33:10–30, 34:30–35:30. 
 241. Hinkebein Order, supra note 20. 
 242. Id. 
 243. See id. 
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concludes this Part by briefly discussing potential solutions to MSPD’s crisis 
– solutions that have proved elusive. 
A. Excessive Caseloads Will Not Mitigate Ethical Violations of Mis-
souri Public Defenders 
One can speculate with reasonable confidence that the Supreme Court of 
Missouri did not consider Karl Hinkebein’s excessive caseload to be a miti-
gating factor for his ethical violations.  Not only do the ABA Standards fail to 
enumerate excessive caseload as a mitigating factor, but there are also sound 
reasons why such mitigation would prove problematic. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri recognized the potential pitfalls of al-
lowing excessive caseload to serve as a mitigating factor, with one judge ex-
plicitly agreeing with Chief Disciplinary Counsel Pratzel’s concern that such 
mitigation would create a “slippery slope.”244  Indeed, if one applied exces-
sive caseload as a mitigating factor for public defenders, there does not seem 
to be a compelling reason that excessive caseload would not be applied as a 
mitigating factor to any lawyer who faced a heavy caseload.245  The Supreme 
Court of Missouri is unlikely to allow the Missouri Rules to be “diluted” in 
such a way.246  Attorneys should be incentivized to ensure they are handling 
only the number of cases in which they can provide competent and diligent 
representation.  Allowing excessive caseload to mitigate ethical violations 
would strip the ethical rules of their intent to regulate each individual law-
yer’s conduct and allow lawyers to abdicate their important ethical responsi-
bilities based on failures of the larger system in which they operate.  While 
systemic flaws should be addressed, indigent defendants the nation over 
would be severely harmed if lawyers faced mere slaps on the wrist for serious 
ethical violations. 
Instead of a willingness to mitigate violations with excessive caseload 
considerations, the Missouri Supreme Court seems to view public defenders 
as having two choices when faced with overburdening workloads: (1) ap-
proach a supervisor and hope they can provide remedial measures or (2) if the 
problem cannot be fixed, quit.247  One judge’s remark bears repeating: 
“[W]hen [attorneys] take the oath to follow the [Missouri] Rules . . . , some-
times that means not taking a case, and sometimes that means taking a differ-
ent job.”248 
 
 244. Oral Argument, supra note 206, at 33:51–34:02.  “I understand your concern 
about recognizing a mitigator of caseload – I share some of your concerns about that 
being a slippery slope.”  Id. 
 245. See id. at 08:10–09:33. 
 246. See id. at 34:30–35:40. 
 247. See id. at 18:35 –55.  “I see a big problem . . . if we allow attorneys to say 
my boss made me do it.”  Id. 
 248. Id. 
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B. The ABA’s Formal Opinion Is Not a Solution to MSPD’s Problem 
The ABA’s Formal Opinion outlines the duties of a lawyer facing an 
excessive caseload that hinder or prevent competent and diligent representa-
tion in a case.249  When public defenders face an excessive caseload, they 
should not take on more cases.250  If appointed to new cases, they should file 
a motion to withdraw, and if that motion is denied, they should appeal.251  
Moreover, public defenders should, if necessary, work their way up the chain 
of command of their public defender system in the event of an excessive 
caseload.252   They should first notify and seek remedial measures from su-
pervisors.253  Supervisors then have a duty to make reasonable efforts to take 
remedial measures in order to ensure a subordinate lawyer is not violating the 
rules.254 
The majority of these mandates, though theoretically logical, cannot 
alone lessen the excessive caseloads plaguing MSPD.  In a system so afflicted 
by lack of funding, lack of staff, and high turnover rates, a supervisor’s 
knowledge of an attorney’s excessive caseload will have little effect.  This is 
because effective remedial measures are often unavailable.  Hinkebein’s case 
illustrates this point.  An obvious remedial measure that a supervisor might 
“reasonably” pursue involves attempting to reassign current (or divert new) 
cases from an overworked attorney to a different, less burdened attorney.  But 
within MPSD, there simply are no lawyers with manageable caseloads who 
can easily take on extra cases – everyone has an excessive caseload.255  Thus, 
supervisors often find their hands are tied as much as subordinate lawyers, 
and there are a limited number of remedial measures other than case reas-
signment that can be “reasonably” pursued without adequate resources and 
staff. 
For the Formal Opinion’s suggestions and mandates to be effective, 
MSPD must have at least some public defenders that are not already overbur-
dened so that caseloads can be redistributed within MSPD when needed.  
Moreover, individual public defenders need to be able to turn down cases 
when necessary and – as recognized by the Eight Guidelines256 – assign cases 
 
 249. Formal Opinion, supra note 176, at 1–2. 
 250. Id. at 4–5. 
 251. See id. at 5. 
 252. Id. at 6. 
 253. Id. 
 254. See id. 
 255. See information supra Table 1. 
 256. Eight Guidelines, supra note 177, at 3.  Guideline 5, in part, directs public 
defender agencies like MSPD to avoid excessive caseloads by: 
 
• Providing additional resources to assist the affected lawyers; 
• Curtailing new case assignments to the affected lawyers; 
• Reassigning cases to different lawyers within the defense program, with 
court approval, if necessary; 
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to private attorneys when necessary.  In the absence of sweeping and mean-
ingful reform that unburdens the system, some MSPD offices have chosen to 
temporarily turn down new cases altogether.257 
C. No Representation, No Sanctions 
In October 2017, David Wallis, one of the District Defenders of District 
13 for MSPD, wrote a letter to local courts stating, “[E]very attorney under 
[my] supervision is currently violating the [Missouri] Rules . . . .  Their cur-
rent caseloads create a conflict of interest with existing clients because they 
are forced to choose effective representation of one client to the detriment of 
other clients.”258  Wallis then stated the District 13 office, which handles 
Boone County and Cooper County cases, would no longer be immediately 
entering appearances in cases wherein a defendant qualifies for representation 
by MSPD.259  Wallis wrote, “This is simply about ensuring all [District] 13 
public defenders are able to maintain their license to practice law without 
threat of discipline by OCDC.”260 
The Boone and Cooper County office “started an internal wait list for 
defendants who qualify for representation.”261  District 13 attorneys immedi-
ately handle cases for the accused in jail,262 but wait list others – for how long 
 
• Arranging for some cases to be assigned to private lawyers in return for rea-
sonable compensation for their services; 
• Urging prosecutors not to initiate criminal prosecutions when civil remedies 
are adequate to address conduct and public safety does not require prosecu-
tion; 
• Seeking emergency resources to deal with excessive workloads or exemp-
tions from funding reductions; 
• Negotiating formal and informal arrangements with courts or other appoint-
ing authorities respecting case assignments; and 
• Notifying courts or other appointing authorities that the Provider is unavail-
able to accept additional appointments. 
 
Id.  (emphasis added). 
 257. Letter from David Wallis, Area 13 of the State Pub. Def. Sys., to Boone and 
Cooper Cty. Courts (Oct. 2, 2017), http://boonecountybar.org/september-26-letter-
from-david-wallis-area-13-of-the-state-public-defender-system-to-boone-and-cooper-
county-courts/ [hereinafter Letter from David Wallis]. 
 258. Id. 
 259. See id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. In an interview with the Columbia Daily Tribune in October 2018, Michael 
Barrett, Director of MSPD, said, “Right now that is the current policy in Boone Coun-
ty. If someone is incarcerated pretrial, they are not placed on the wait list.  We repre-
sent them right away.”  Pat Pratt, Director: Public Defenders Can’t ‘Keep Up’ with 
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depends on the severity of the charges.263  As of October 2018, the wait list 
system was still in effect.264  At times, the wait list included over 600 differ-
ent cases.265  In September 2018, state leaders gave Wallis’ office $100,000 
to reduce the District 13 wait list.266  District 13 used those funds in part to 
contract with approximately twenty private attorneys to handle the “aging 
cases on the wait list,” prioritizing felony cases that had been on the wait list 
for over six months.267 
When the wait list was implemented, MSPD believed that, despite the 
wait list creating longer case pendency, cases would actually be resolved 
more expeditiously “once [MSPD] [was] able to ethically enter” and begin 
work on them.268  In October 2018, Wallis stated that District 13 attorneys 
were doing better work and working longer hours because they were experi-
encing positive outcomes for their clients.269  Wallis recognized, however, 
that the improved work done on cases, particularly for the accused in custody, 
came at the cost of others waiting months for legal help.270  Nonetheless, 
according to Michael Barrett, Director of MSPD, “[T]he wait list allows 
[MSPD to provide] constitutionally competent representation for our existing 
clients, which is in stark contrast to life before the wait lists.”271 
When he first made the wait list announcement in 2017, Wallis stated 
his only ends were to achieve “effective, zealous and diligent representation 
of poor persons by [attorneys] who are not under threat of Bar discipline by 
OCDC.”272  Wallis and his attorneys were not the only public defenders who 
feared disciplinary action by OCDC.  According to Barrett, “[MSPD] re-
ceived a number of resignations in the hours following oral argument in [the 
 
 263. See Boone County Public Defenders Get More Money to Handle Wait List, 
ABC17 NEWS (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.abc17news.com/news/boone-county-
public-defenders-get-more-money-to-handle-wait-list/818956576; see also Letter 
from David Wallis, supra note 257 (explaining that they monitor an “attorney[s’] 
work load and the wait list, and [then] assign[s] attorneys to cases based on custody 
status and severity of the charge(s)”). 
 264. See Boone County Public Defenders Get More Money to Handle Wait List, 
supra note 263. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Letter from David Wallis, supra note 257. 
 269. See Boone County Public Defenders Get More Money to Handle Wait List, 
supra note 263. 
 270. Id.  
 271. Pratt, supra note 262. 
 272. Letter from David Wallis, supra note 257. 
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Hinkebein] case.”273  Barrett, in 2018, stated that the wait lists have helped 
retain MSPD defenders post-Hinkebein.274 
D. Choosing to Privatize in Texas County 
An alternative to the wait list system is the privatization of public de-
fense work.  MSPD has decided one Missouri county will do just that – as of 
March 1, 2018, indigent defendants in rural Texas County will be appointed 
private counsel, which the state of Missouri will pay for.275 
Texas County is home to approximately 26,000 residents.276  In 2017, 
MSPD opened roughly 530 cases in Texas County, with only one being han-
dled by a privately contracted attorney.277  Like most MSPD offices, the 
problem with MSPD’s previous representation in Texas County was the ex-
cessive caseload.278  In this instance, the large caseload was the result of a 
single MSPD office – District 25 – representing six counties simultaneous-
ly.279  According to MSPD’s annual report, the MSPD office responsible for 
Texas County was assigned approximately 3,700 total cases in 2017.280  
There are only thirteen public defenders assigned to this particular office.281  
Thus, if cases were divided evenly, each attorney in this office would have 
been assigned and responsible for almost 285 cases in 2017 alone.282  That 
equals a new case every 1.3 days.283 
 It seems probable the outsized caseload took a toll on the public de-
fenders working in this office.  In a span of eighteen months, eleven out of 
the thirteen attorneys quit.284  Although the office re-hired as these attorneys 
 
 273. Letter from Michael Barrett, Dir. of the Mo. State Pub. Defs’ Office, to 
Boone Cty. Bar Ass’n (Oct. 2, 2017), http://boonecountybar.org/letter-to-bcba-from-
the-director-of-the-missouri-state-public-defenders-office/. 
 274. Pratt, supra note 262 (“Before we did wait lists, it sent [MSPD attorneys] 
packing . . .  They feared for their law licenses and they left.  If we don’t have wait 
lists and they have too many cases they can’t handle, they say I’m afraid someone is 
going to challenge my law license and I’m out of here.”). 
 275. Chadde, supra note 104. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. See id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id.  For comparison, that is almost one thousand fewer cases than St. Louis 
County, which has a population five times greater than all six of District 25’s counties 
combined.  Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. This number was calculated by taking the total number of cases assigned in 
2017 (3,700) and dividing by the thirteen attorneys in the office (3,700/13 = 284.6). 
 283. This number was calculated by dividing the number of days in a year (365 
excluding leap years) by the calculated number of cases an attorney in the MSPD 
office representing Texas County was theoretically assigned in 2017 (365/285 = 
1.28).   
 284. Chadde, supra note 104. 
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left, a turnover rate of almost eighty-five percent in eighteen months is 
enough to give pause.285 
The rate of compensation for contract work in Texas County will de-
pend on the severity of the case, as is the standard for all of MSPD’s contract 
work.  An initial retainer fee is paid in accordance with the following guide-
lines, with additional compensation for cases resolved by trial. 
 
Table 2. Private Attorney Compensation Rates286 
 
Description Contract Guideline 
Murder 1st Degree $10,000 
Sexual Predator Trial $8,000 
Sexual Predator Hearing $4,000 
Other Homicide $6,000 
AB Felony Drug $750 
AB Felony Other $1,500 
AB Felony Sex $2,000 
CDE Felony Drug $750 
CDE Felony Other $750 
CDE Felony Sex $1,500 
Misdemeanor $375 
Juvenile - Non-Violent $500 
Juvenile - Violent $750 
Probation Violation $375 
PCR Rule 24.035 Motion $500 
PCR Rule 24.035 Evidentiary Hearing $250 
PCR Rule 24.035 Appeal $500 
PCR Rule 29.15 Motion $1,000 
PCR Rule 29.15 Evidentiary Hearing $500 
PCR Rule 29.15 Appeal $1,875 
Direct Appeal $3,750 
 
 
 285. Id.  This was found by dividing the number of attorneys who left by the 
number of attorneys in the office (11/13 = 84.61). 
 286. This table is originally from Panel Attorney Opportunities and Contract 
Rates, MO. ST. PUB. DEFENDER, https://publicdefender.mo.gov/private-counsel-
opportunities/mspd-contracting/panel-rates/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2018).  The follow-
ing information is found below the table at its original source: “Jury Trial: $1,500 for 
the first day and $750 for each additional day, partial days prorated.  Bench Trial: 
$750/day, partial days prorated.”  Id. 
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Despite the problems MSPD was facing in Texas County, there is no 
guarantee private attorneys will step up to the plate.  Representative Robert 
Ross, R-Yukon, who represents Texas County, thinks they will.287  He be-
lieves private attorneys will “love that opportunity for business.”288 
In fact, Ross is an advocate of privatizing nearly the entire MSPD sys-
tem.  On February 6, 2018, Ross introduced House Bill 2396 (“HB2396”), 
which, though it never gained traction, would have mandated that certain 
legal services provided to indigent defendants be contracted out to private 
attorneys.289  HB2396 would have repealed the provision allowing OSPD to 
contract with private attorneys on a case-by-case basis only.290  HB2396 
would have instead commanded that “all class C, D, and E felony cases, all 
misdemeanor cases, all traffic cases, and all probation violation cases” be 
contracted out to private attorneys.291  These cases make up almost ninety 
percent of MSPD’s caseload, according to MSPD’s 2017 annual report.292  
Under this proposal, MSPD would have handled approximately nine percent 
of its current caseload – Class A and B felonies such as murder, first-degree 
robbery, and certain sex crimes.293 
HB2396 would have implemented a competitive bidding process for 
awarding contacts to private attorneys.294  Under HB2396, contracts would 
have been awarded to the lowest bidder, but “priority” would have been “giv-
en to bidders who exhibit experience in criminal law, demonstrate the capaci-
ty to provide effective representation in all assigned cases, and carry suffi-
cient malpractice insurance.”295  Bids would have been subject to and ap-
proved by the presiding judge of the judicial circuit where the services were 
to be rendered.296 
Despite its curb appeal, a low-bid contract system such as that contem-
plated by HB2396 would most likely cost the state more money instead of 
saving it money.  Private attorneys are very unlikely to bid on contracts at the 
extremely low cost that MSPD expends per case.  On average, MSPD spent 
only $325 per trial division case disposition in 2017,297 and private attorneys 
 
 287. Chadde, supra note 104. 
 288. Id. 
 289. H.R. 2396, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018), 
https://house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills181/hlrbillspdf/6205H.01I.pdf. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. See MISSOURI PUBLIC DEFENDER COMMISSION, FISCAL YEAR 2017 ANNUAL 
REPORT 20 (2017), 
https://archive.org/details/2017MOPublicDefenderAnnRpt/page/n0 [hereinafter 
FISCAL YEAR 2017 ANNUAL REPORT]; see also Chadde, supra note 104. 
 293. Chadde, supra note 104. 
 294. H.R. 2396. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. 
 297. FISCAL YEAR 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 292, at 13 (2017) (“The 
average direct cost of all cases disposed by [MSPD] (including Death Penalty Repre-
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are exceptionally unlikely to make bids this low – many experienced, private 
criminal defense lawyers make almost that much per hour.298  Further, legis-
lation like HB2396 raises concerns about ensuring competent representation – 
awarding cases to attorneys with the lowest bids will result in less-
experienced lawyers (perhaps not always even criminal defense lawyers) 
receiving cases more often than experienced lawyers whose time is worth 
more.299  This Note does not attempt to touch on all of the potential problems 
inherent to large-scale privatization, but such a drastic measure ought not be 
considered lightly.300    
Adequate funding would negate the desire to privatize MSPD, but Mis-
souri has been battling a severe budget crisis,301 and creative methods for 
funding would be required.302   Scholars have proposed re-examining crimi-
nal offenses – “reducing more misdemeanors to infractions or civil forfei-
tures” 303 – and “check[ing] spiraling corrections budgets”304 as a means of 
saving money that can be funneled to MSPD. 
 
sentation) in Fiscal Year 2017 was $396.52.  The Trial Division average was just 
$325.31.”). 
 298. See Heather Cole, Compare & Contrast: Missouri Lawyer Price Range from 
$65 to $793 Per Hour, MO. LAW. WKLY. (June 17, 2013), 
https://molawyersmedia.com/2013/06/17/compare-contrast-missouri-lawyer-prices-
range-from-65-to-793-per-hour/. 
 299. The word “priority” is not absolute.  The possibility would still exist that a 
low bidder – one without enough experience to make them qualified – wins a bid 
because it is markedly lower than a more qualified attorney.  Moreover, “experience 
in criminal law” is a vague standard, and the proposal made no attempt to define what 
constitutes “experience.”  Similarly, the proposal made no attempt to define what 
constitutes the “capacity to provide effective representation in all assigned cases.”  
HB2396 attempted to hedge these equivocal standards by creating a quality assurance 
program.  See H.R. 2396.  With the assistance of the presiding judge in each circuit, 
the quality assurance program would have sought “to ensure that defendants are being 
provided quality representation by private attorneys awarded contracts . . . .”  Id. 
 300. For a broader discussion of historically deficient systems of privatization, see 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONTRACTING FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES: A SPECIAL 
REPORT (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/181160.pdf. 
 301. See generally Phill Brooks, Missouri Heading for a Looming Budget Cliff, 
COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (Jan. 28, 2018), 
http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/20180128/missouri-heading-for-looming-
budget-cliff. 
 302. See Rodney Uphoff, Foreword, Broke and Broken: Can We Fix our State 
Indigent Defense System?, 75 MO. L. REV. 667 (2010) for proposed solutions on sav-
ing money that could then be allocated to the public defender system. 
 303. Id. at 675. 
 304. Id. at 676. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Since 2005, many efforts have been undertaken to improve MSPD’s 
hand-in-hand problems of underfunding and excessive caseload, yet none 
have proved particularly effective.305  Until adequate funding is provided that 
allows for more attorneys and reasonable caseloads throughout the system, 
public defenders will continue to face circumstances that make it difficult to 
comply with the Missouri Rules, and indigent defendants will suffer.  With-
out a workable systemic solution, mandates from the ABA, such as those 
found in the ABA’s Formal Opinion, can alleviate the problem only so much. 
This leaves public defenders in a catch-22 situation.  Hinkebein suggests 
that if a public defender cannot find relief through the chain of command or 
court order, quitting may be the necessary solution.  Not only are public de-
fenders unlikely to be keen on quitting, but if quitting is the necessary solu-
tion following unmet requests for remedial relief, MSPD and the public will 
be harmed by the loss of experienced and skilled public defenders – resigna-
tions would exacerbate MSPD’s already high turnover rates and its continu-
ing inability to reassign cases to less burdened attorneys.  Nonetheless, 
Hinkebein serves as a warning to Missouri public defenders: Even the hard-
working and highly motivated defender who continues on in the face of an 
excessive caseload faces the possibility of sanctions for ethical violations – 
sanctions that will not be mitigated by the public defender’s excessive case-
load.  Public defenders are “risking their professional lives,” indeed. 
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